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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
no cases which have permitted removal for misconduct during
an interregnum in office or for misconduct prior to having ever
been elected.
G.R.J.
LIBEL-CREDIT AGENCIES-QUALIFIED PRIVILEGES-The nation-
wide growth of credit agencies has raised many difficult legal
problems. Conspicuous among these are those arising in the field
of defamation. There has been much conflict in the courts as to
the privileges of defamation to be allowed such agencies in con-
ducting their business. The English courts, together with those
in a few American jurisdictions, have stated that the motive of
profit destroys all privilege and hold such agencies to absolute
liability for false communications.' The general American rule,
however, has been to recognize the economic need for such or-
ganizations, and to accord them a privilege on certain occasions. 2
The Louisiana courts have not recently had occasion to pass on
this problem. There is, however, an earlier case which may well
become a landmark in our jurisprudence and which, therefore,
merits consideration.
Defendant, a credit agency, made a general report to its sub-
scribers that a suit was pending against S. Giacona and Son. The
suit, in fact, was against S. Giacona and not against the plaintiff
S. Giacona and Son, as erroneously reported. Plaintiff sued for
damages showing that credit had been refused it because of de-
fendant's report. Held, defendant was liable for compensatory
damages for negligence in not checking the court record. Giacona
v. Bradstreet Company, 48 La. Ann. 1191, 20 So. 706 (1896).
The syllabus prepared by the court states the rule prevalent
in most jurisdictions that a publication of a credit agency issued
to subscribers generally is not a privileged communication.$ On
1. Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007
(1914); Macintosh v. Dun [1908] A.C. 390. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of
Torts (1933) 539, § 249; Prosser, Law of Torts (1941) 835.
2. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (4 ed. 1932) 558, § 159; Harper,
loc. cit. supra note 1; Prosser, loc. cit. supra note 1.
3. Erber and Stickler v. R. J. Dun and Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C.C. Ark. 1882);
Simons v. Petersberger, 181 Iowa 770, 165 N.W. 91 (1917); Pollasky v. Mincher,
81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Hanschke v. Merchants Credit Bureau, 256
Mich. 272, 239 N.W. 318 (1932); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W.
358 (1893); King v. Patterson, 49 N.J. Law 417, 9 Atl. 705, 60 Am. Rep. 622
(1887); Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N.Y. 188, 7 Am. Rep. 322 (1871); Brad-
street Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753, 2 L.R.A., 403 (1888).
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the other hand, it is generally held that where the communica-
tion is sent on request to an interested person, it is qualifiedly
privileged.4
In the opinion of the instant case, however, the court ignored
the question of privilege mentioned in the syllabus and rested the
decision on the basis of negligence. The rule stated was as fol-
lows:
"With reference to these companies, the rule is that publish-
ing of a tradesman that he has been sued, if true, is not action-
able; but, if untrue, and is owing to negligence, it may give
rise to an action." (Italics supplied.)
The above statement seems to require a finding of negligence.
But, since the communication was sent to subscribers generally,
therefore not privileged, there should have been no necessity to
find negligence. 5
In view of the conflicting language employed in the syllabus
and the opinion, the present status of the Louisiana law cannot
be regarded as settled.6 It is suggested, however, that in subse-
quent cases Louisiana will follow the prevailing American rule
as stated in the syllabus.
M.D.R.
MINERAL RIGHTS-RECITAL OF OUTSTANDING MINERAL RIGHTS
IN A DEED OF SALE AS A RESERVATION-ERROR OF LAw-The vendor
bank owned certain property which it sold under a deed contain-
ing a recitation to the effect that all minerals had been sold from
the tract before acquisition thereof by the vendor, and that there-
fore they were excluded from the conveyance. However, prescrip-
tion had run on the mineral servitude, and though the vendor was
ignorant of the fact, the minerals had reverted to its ownership
prior to the sale. Subsequently, the vendee learned of this and
4. Erber and Stickler v. R. G. Dun and Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C.C. Ark. 1882);
Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (C.C. Md. 1882); Pollasky v. Mincher, 81
Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Omsky v. Douglas, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868); Bradstreet
Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753, 2 L.R.A. 405 (1888).
5. See Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Publishing Co., 48 La. Ann. 1116, 1135,
20 So. 173, 180 (1896). Cooley, op. cit. supra note 2, at 519, § 149; Prosser, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 815.
6. Where expression in syllabus prepared by the court is modified by
opinion, the opinion must be looked to for the authority of the decision. See
Cabral v. Victor and Provost, 181 La. 139, 146, 158 So. 821, 823 (1934). See also
Burdick v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162, 165, 34 S.Ct. 299, 301, 58 L.Ed. 551, 554 (1914).
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